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MINIMUM AGE DIFFERENCE AS A
REQUISITE FOR ADOPTION
WALTER J. WADLINGTON, III*
Recent incidents of abortive uses of adoption statutes have
pointed up the possible need for a healthy change in our adoption
laws: the inclusion of a required age difference between adopter
and adoptee. The author urges that such a statutory requirement
is necessary to more fully effectuate the idea that "adoption imi-
tates nature;" a postulate of adoption law originating in Roman
jurisprudence and, so the author contends, underlying adoption
law in this country. The article raises interesting questions con-
cerning the very nature of adoption, the function which it serves
in our society, and the possible policy differences between minor
and adult adoptions.
INTRODUCTION
It is settled that a man cannot adopt another person older than
himself, for adoption imitates nature, and it would be unnatural
for a son to be older than his fathert
A FEW YEARS AGO a husband in Kentucky contributed greatly
to the legal lore of his state and perhaps of the entire United
States when he adopted his wife. Despite arguments that this
was not in accord with the basic purpose of adoption in this country
and that it created something which looked suspiciously like an in-
cestuous relationship by operation of law, the highest court of Ken-
tucky upheld the adoption's legal validity.' Although we might be
tempted to dismiss the case as one of those occasional aberrations
which will occur only infrequently, this is in fact not the case.2
* A.B. 1951, Duke University; LL.B. 1954, Tulane University. Professor of Law,
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t INsTrTUTES 1.11.4 (Moyle transl.). The full Latin text is "Minorem natu non
posse maiorem adoptare placet: adoptio enim naturam imitatur et pro monstro est, ut
major sit filius quam pater..... MoYLE, IMPERATORIS IUSTINIANI INSTITUTIONES 140
(1923).
1 Bedinger v. Graybill's Ex'r & Trustee, 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957). The deceased
husband was the life beneficiary of a trust, the remainder of which was to pass to his
"heirs at law," and to named charities if there were no heirs (presumably the wife
qua wife would not qualify).
2In Wilson v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1965), the remainder in a trust was
left to the life beneficiary's "children." Shortly before his death, the life beneficiary
adopted the two children of his deceased wife's former marriage, aged forty-eight and
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Even if it were, we should reflect upon it more carefully as an il-
lustration of how our adoption statutes may be utilized for perhaps
totally undesirable and totally unintended purposes.8 For example,
if the logical (or illogical) progression ensues from this case and
its progeny, the next probable step will be for someone to adopt
his father or mother-or perhaps even a grandparent. The fact of
relationship through consanguinity would seem to present no
greater obstacle than relationship through affinity in most juris-
dictions.4 And surely the problem of having a twenty-one-year-old
father with a seventy-five-year-old child is no more objectionable
socially than having a man legally married to his daughter, even in a
society which still condemns incest and ostensibly imposes legal
sanctions against the practice. 5
As the previous paragraph indicates, the anomalous situations
which can occur will generally be produced by adult adoptions.
It is true that many of the underlying reasons for unusual adoptions
do not lend themselves to adoption of minors;6 it is also true that
fifty-two. In Pennington v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 890 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.
1965), "at age 74, Dudley W. Pennington, was adopted by his childless wife, age 71,"
in order to save a similar remainder in a trust. In the Master of Estate of Comley, 90
NJ. Super. 498, 218 A.2d 175 (Gloucester County Ct. 1966), involved a trust fund equal
portions of which were to be distributed to the "children" of the settlor's brother at
age thirty-five. The brother adopted the plaintiff when she was thirty-six.
In the above three cases, the courts held that "children" should be construed as
including only natural-born children and persons adopted as minors.
The Kentucky legislature was evidently unconcerned with the problem when they
amended their adoption statute after the Bedinger case. They lowered the age at
which one could be adopted as an adult from twenty-one to eighteen years but
added no proscription on husband-wife adoptions. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.390
(Supp. 1965).
See note 6 infra.
'Several states do specifically exclude adoptions between certain classes of persons.
Connecticut, in its statute providing for adoption of adults, forbids one from adopting
his "wife, husband, brother, sister, uncle or aunt." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-67
(Supp. 1965). Massachusetts has a similar provision applicable to adoption in general.
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 210, § 1 (1955).
'Nevada has found both alternatives objectionable enough to justify preventive
legislation. In its provision on adoption of adults it requires that the adopter
be older than the adoptee; once this requirement has been met he can adopt any
adult other than his spouse. Nv. REv. STAT. § 127.190 (1963). And see the more in-
clusive statutes in note 4 supra.
Marriage or sexual relations between a parent and his adopted child are generally
considered to be outside most incest laws (unless there is a pre-existing blood rela-
tionship) because relationship by adoption is distinguished from relationship through
either affinity or consanguinity. For a discussion of the confusion on this subject,
see Wadlington, The Adopted Child and Intra-Family Marriage Prohibitions, 49 VA.
L. REv. 478 (1963).
0 With a little bit of imagination it is possible to come up with a number of pur-
poses (often questionable) for adoption of an adult. The most obvious one has already
been mentioned: to acquire a legal heir rapidly in order to benefit from the pro-
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the procedural obstacles will ordinarily be greater in this latter
situation.7 Nevertheless, the danger of illegitimate use of adoption
laws even where a minor is the adoptee compels us to consider this
facet of the problem as well.
Specific legislation barring adoption of close relatives8 or for-
bidding the use of adoption for named purposes is, of course, one
possible method of attacking these problems. Abolition of the in-
stitution of adult adoptions would be at least a partial solution.0
But a less drastic alternative, one which is admittedly not a panacea,
but which also would produce healthy effects beyond the immediate
problem, is to require a minimum age difference between adopter
and adoptee in all cases.
Some states and many foreign countries already provide for such
a mandatory age variation. The purpose of this article is to examine
the various laws requiring or failing to require a minimum age
difference between adopter and adoptee, along with the conflicting
social interests involved, so that it can be determined whether
further safeguards are desirable or necessary in our own state laws
at this time.
I
THE CIVIL LAW APPROACH
In most civilian jurisdictions the Roman law principle of
adoptio naturam imitatur (adoption imitates nature) has led to
legislative safeguards which prevent an adoption if the person to be
adopted is not old enough to be the adopter's natural child. These
provisions and this principle have origins in Justinian's time or be-
fore, and the discussion of the civil law approach therefore must be-
gin with a review of the applicable Roman law.
visions of a known testamentary or trust provision. Tax considerations are another
possibility. Further, a man might well adopt his concubine in order to justify living
in the same house with her and to constitute her as an heir, all without what might
seem to him some of the undesirable aspects of the marriage relationship, such as the
necessity of grounds for divorce and the possibility of alimony should he tire of her
company. Or a parent who wishes to cut down the size of any forced or statutory
share of an estate which might go to his blood children might well adopt a number
of others out of spite. Further, in a day when the plain old "kook" has come into
his own, one oddball might simply adopt a flock of others for the sheer hell of it.
7The requisite procedures frequently are quite different for adult and minor
adoptions. Compare CAL. Civ. CODE § 226 with CAL. CIv. CODE § 227p. Compare FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 72.12-.15 (1964) with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 72.34-.37 (1964). Compare Tax.
Rav. Cav. STAT. ANN. art. 46a (1959) with TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46b-1 (1959).
8 A few states have so provided. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
See Wadlington, Adoption of Adults in Louisiana, 40 TU. L. REv. 1 (1965).
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A. The Roman Law Background
The institution of adoption in Roman law is generally con-
sidered as having existed primarily for the benefit of the adopter
or his family.10 It assumed two basic forms, adoptio'l and adrogatio.2
In the former, the person adopted was alieni iuris (subject to pa-
ternal authority), while in the latter the adopted-or, more properly,
adrogated-party was sui iuris (not subject to paternal authority).13
By the time of Justinian both adoptio and adrogatio were governed
by adoptio naturam imitatur.14 Accordingly, a castratus could not
adopt 5 (though an adopter need not be married because procreation
could take place outside of marriage, assuming that the parties
were properly equipped"), and the adopter had to be sufficiently
older than the adopted person to have been capable of procreating
him.17 The latter requirement seems to be of relatively late develop-
ment. Previously, Gaius had made a reference to "the dispute
whether a younger can adopt an older person,""' and there is evi-
dence of an accusation by Cicero that Clodius was adrogated by
someone younger than he.' 9 Nevertheless, by the time of Modestinus
it seems clear that in either adoptio or adrogatio the party adopting
had to be at least eighteen years older than the party adopted,20
and this rule was included in the Institutes of Justinian.21 It should
be noted that under Roman law normally only a male could adopt
because a woman was incapable of patria potestas (paternal author-
ity).22 This rule was gradually relaxed to allow adoption by women
in certain limited cases (for example, when a mother had lost all
'
0 Among the various personal ends served by adoption in Rome were the con-
tinuance of the res sacra or family religious rites (see NICHOLS, AN INTRODUcrrON TO
ROMAN LAW 77 (1962)), and the selection by an emperor of his successor (see WOLFF,
ROMAN LAW 17, 45 (1951)).
"See BucK.AND, A TExTsooK OF ROMAN LAW 121-28 (3d rev. ed. 1963).
% See id. at 124.
"3The older of the two was adrogatio. Because of the sui iuris status of the party
adrogated, it also had the most sweeping effects, since one family was in effect ex-
tinguished through merger with another.
"INSTITUTES 1.11.1, .4.
15 INSTITUTES 1.11.9.
10 BUCKLAND, op. cit. supra note 11, at 123.
'
7 INSTITUTES 1.11.4; see BUCKLAND, op. cit. supra note 11, at 123.
18 GAus 1.106.
0 CicERO, DE DoMo SuA AD PONTICS ORATIO 13-14 (Nisbet ed. 1939); MoYLE,
IMPERATORIS IUSTINIANI INSITTUTIONES § 4, at 140 (1923); Huard, The Law of Adoption:






her children 23), but it seems clear that the specifically required age
difference of eighteen years was based on the normal difference
between father and child rather than mother and child, with eighteen
being the latest date at which the male would be expected to reach
maturity.24
B. The Civil Law Today
Although the Roman law of adoption was by no means carried
directly into modern civil law jurisdictions, 25 it certainly served as
an important influence. Its "adoption imitates nature" principle
has continued at least to the extent of requiring a minimum age dif-
ference between adopter and adoptee. Furthermore, the basic pur-
pose of adoption in most of the modern civil law jurisdictions still
seems to be satisfaction of the needs of the adopter-or at least the
adopter's needs are considered as important as those of the adoptee.20
This is illustrated by the frequent legislative inclusion of a fairly
high minimum age for the adopter, independent of the require-
ment of a minimum age difference. A few of the major civil law
jurisdictions will be discussed to illustrate the consensus today.
1. France
The institution of adoption had almost disappeared in France
by the time of the French Revolution,27 but in 1792 adoption was
23Ibid; see JoLowscz, ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LAW 196 (1957).24
INSTITUTES 1.11.4. It should be noted that under Roman law a person could
be adopted not just as a son but as a grandson or even a great grandson. INSTIrTUis
1.11.5. At least one eminent Roman law scholar has stated that in such instances a
proportionate increase in the required age variation would be made in consideration
of the more remote degree. BUCKLAND, op. cit. supra note 11, at 123.
25 See JoLOWicZ, op. cit. supra note 23, at 196.
20 The approach to adoption in France affords a good example of this point. See
AMOs & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 78 (2d ed. 1963). The debates over re-
introduction of the institution of adoption into the Civil Code illustrate some of the
mixed feelings about its purpose. See 10 FENET, REcIuEIL COMPLEr DES TRAVAUX
PREPARATOIRS DU CODE CIVIL 247 (1827). Particularly harsh were the words of M.
Tronchet that 'Tadoption n'est plus qu'un moyen d'6luder les prohibitions par
lesquelles la loi limite, surtour A 1'6gard des enfans naturels, la facultd de disposer, ou
une manire de satisfaire la vanit6 de ceux qui ddsirent perpdtuer leur nom et leur
famille." Id. at 255-56.
Even today adoption in France is revocable under certain circumstances, and the
adopter remains a member of his natural family in many respects. See CODE CIVIL
arts. 354-67 (Fr. 66th ed. Dalloz 1966). However, since World War I there has been
more of a tendency toward viewing and utilizing adoption as a method for accomplish-
ing the socially desirable result of caring for homeless infants. This is evidenced by the
introduction of the new institution of adoptive legitimation, discussed in text accom-
panying notes 38-42 infra.
27 See BRissAuD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW 218 (1912); 6 DEMOLOMBE,
COUPS DE CODE NAPOLEON, TRAIT DE L'ADOPTION 2-3 (1875).
[VCol. 1966: 892
REQUISITE FOR ADOPTION
included in the general plan of laws,28 and in 1803 it was incor-
porated into the Civil Code29 in limited form. Only persons older
than fifty could adopt, and the adoption could not take place until
the party to be adopted had reached majority.80 Though the basic
purpose of adoption was primarily to perpetuate family lines for
childless parents,"1 the drafters still recognized that the artificially
created parent-child relationship should nevertheless conform to
biological reality, and an age difference of fifteen years between the
adopter and the adopted party was made mandatory.
2
In the modem French law, minors may be adopted,8 and the
minimum age of the adopting party has been reduced to thirty-
five.34 But the required age difference of fifteen years between
adopter and adoptee has been maintained,35 with several exceptions.
If the person to be adopted is the child of the adopter's spouse, then
the required age difference is reduced to ten years.80 And there is
provision for a special reduction of the age variation, or even a com-
plete dispensation from its provisions, by the chief of state.1
Because adoption in French law is still subject to limitations
which make it fall unnecessarily short of the normal parent-child
relationships,8 a new institution known as adoptive legitimation
was added in 1939.39 In its present form, the party to be adopted
cannot be over the age of seven,40 and the adopting parties must be
a married couple.41 In this form of adoption, which comes much
closer to our own in approach, the same age differential require-
ments as in the regular French adoption provisions are applicable.
42
2 8 The Law of January 18, 1792, and the legislation following it are outlined in
DEMOLOMBE, op. cit. supra note 27, at 3-7; 1 PLANIoL, TRArrP EULMENTAIRE- DE DRorr
CIVIL Nos. 1570-70A (1959).
29 CODE CrVIL arts. 343-52 (Fr. 1803).
30 CODE CIVIL arts. 343, 346 (Fr. 1803).
31 See AMos & WALTON, op. cit. supra note 26, at 78; PANIOL, op. cit. supra note 28,
at No. 1569.
32 CODE CIVIL art. 343 (Fr. 1803).
"CODE CIVIL art. 343 (Fr. 66th ed. Dalloz 1966).




"For example, the adoption may be revoked under grave circumstances, according
to article 367, and for many purposes the adoptee remains a member of his original
family. See Amos & WALTON, op. cit. supra note 26, at 78-79.
"9 CODE CIVL arts. 368-70 (Fr. 66th ed. Dalloz 1966); see AMOS & WALTON, Op. Cit.
supra note 26, at 79.






Under Italian law, the adopter must be at least fifty years old
and have no living descendants, 43 and he must be at least eighteen
years older than the adopted party.44 In special circumstances, the
age of the adopter may be reduced to forty and the required age
difference to sixteen years. 45
The Swiss Civil Code requires the adopter to be forty years old
and without legitimate descendants.4 6 He also must be at least
eighteen years older than the adopted party.47
Unless the person to be adopted is the natural child of either of
the spouses seeking to adopt him, a difference of twenty years in age
is required under the laws of Quebec.48
Under its new Civil Code, Greece provides both for a minimum
age of fifty for the adopter 49 and a minimum age difference of
eighteen years between adopter and adopteer 0
Although the Roman law requirement of a difference of eighteen
years was found in Las Siete Partidas,51 the Spanish Civil Code of
1889 lowered this to fifteen years. 52
3. A Summary
In a 1956 United Nations study on adoption,53 which included
a number of the previously mentioned countries, it was found that
approximately two-thirds of the twenty-odd jurisdictions which were
examined (including four states in this country and three Canadian
provinces54) required an age differential between adopter and
"C6DICE CIvILE art. 291 (Italy 1958).
"Ibid.
"The authority to grant such an exception is vested in the Court of Appeals.
C6DICE CaviLE art. 291 (Italy 1953).
"a CODE CIVIL art. 264 (Swit. Rossel 1957).
,1 Ibid.
"QuE. REV. STAT. 1941, c. 324, § 4.
'6 CIVIL CODE art. 1568 (Greece 1956).
50 CIVIL CODE art. 1574 (Greece 1956).
51 LAS SIETz PARTmAS 4.16.2 (Spain CCH 1931).
5 CIVIL CODE art. 173 (Spain 1889). In discussing this requirement and its origin
in the "adoption imitates nature" principle, Manresa points out that Spanish law at
that time regarded twelve as the age of puberty for females and fourteen for males.
See 2 MANRESA, COMENTARIES AL C6DIGO CIVIL ESPANOL 71 (1907).
53 Comparative Analysis of Adoption Laws, U.N. Doc. No. ST/SOA/30 (1956).
"'Id. at 16. The countries included in the study were Denmark, France, Greece,
Northern Ireland, Poland, Switzerland, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and Yugo-
slavia, in Europe; Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, and Uruguay, in Latin America.
In North America three Canadian provinces (Quebec, Ontario, and Saskatchewan)




adoptee. The lowest fixed age difference among those jurisdictions




One cannot speak of a common law approach to adoption, be-
cause the common law had no such institution as either we or the
Romans have used and understood the term.56 The Adoption of
Children Act, 1926,57 which first brought adoption to England,
provided only for the adoption of infants and required that an
adopter be at least twenty-five years old and twenty-one years older
than the adoptee.59 If the adopter and the infant were "within the
prohibited degrees of consanguinity,"5' 0 the courts were given dis-
cretion to disregard the requirement of a minimum age difference.
This provision was construed judicially to mean that the court's
discretion could be exercised only when the parties were within the
degree of blood relationship prescribed for marriage, and without
regard to sex."1 Thus a mother could adopt her illegitimate daugh-
ter less than twenty-one years her junior, but the mother's husband
could not join in the adoption unless he were the natural father or
twenty-one years older than the infant. This anomalous situation
was remedied by legislation permitting adoption jointly by two
spouses without an age differential requirement if one of the spouses
was either the natural mother or putative father.6 2
In 1958 the required twenty-one-year age difference was elim-
inated.63 However, the structure of the present act still assures that
there will ordinarily be a minimum age difference of at least five
years, and generally more, since the adopter must be either (a) the
"' CAL. CIV. CODnE § 222.
58For the background and development of the English law of adoption, see
BROMLEY, FAMILY LAw 385 (2d ed. 1962); James, The Illegitimate and Deprived
Child: Legitimation and Adoption, in A CENTURY OF FAMILY LAW 39, 45-55 (Graveson
& Crane eds. 1957).
37 Adoption of Children Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 29.
"Adoption of Children Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 29, § 2 (1) (a).
31 Adoption of Children Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 29, § 2 (1) (b).
00 Ibid.
61 In re "C," [1938] Ch. 121 (1937).
62 Adoption of Children (Regulation) Act, 1939, 2 & 8 Geo. 6, c. 27, § 8. The amend-
ment also added the specific proviso concerning adoption by the mother alone.
03 The Adoption Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 26, § 2 (1) (a), had maintained the required
age difference of twenty-one years. But the Adoption Act, 1958, 7 Eliz. 2, c. 5, greatly
revised the language of § 2 of the former acts, eliminating the required age difference.
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child's mother or father, (b) a relative at least twenty-one years old,
or (c) a person twenty-five years or older.6 4 If the prospective adop-
ters are a married couple adopting jointly, the minimum age re-
quirement becomes unimportant if either is the mother or father of
the child; and if condition (b) or (c) is met by one of the spouses,
then the other need only be age twenty-one or more.65 The act still
only applies to the adoption of infants.
III
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND IN THE UNITED STATES
Because adoption is a creature of state law, it is not surprising
to discover that there have been several different approaches to the
problem of a required age difference between adopter and adoptee
in this country. To a large extent we can explain these variations by
examining the several statutes or draft proposals of adoption laws
which have proved most influential on different groups of states.
The chief such influences seem to have been (A) the civil law (pri-
marily as received through French or Spanish influence), (B) the
Massachusetts statute of 1851, (C) the Civil Code of New York, which
was never adopted in that state, but which became an important legis-
lative influence in the midwestern and far western states, and (D)
the Uniform Adoption Act. Each of these four influences and its
effect on the age differential problem will be considered separately.
A. The Civil Law Influence
At one time Louisiana and Texas adoption law bore a strong
Spanish influence, as shown by some early cases which cited Las
Siete Partidas.6 6 We may assume, therefore, that at that time a
required age variation existed.6 7 But the modern law of both states
has come a long way from the earlier Spanish law.
In Louisiana, adoption was specifically abolished by the Civil
Code of 1808,68 and a similar proscription was inserted in the Civil
Code of 1825.69 Nevertheless, adoption could be effected during this
66 Adoption Act, 1958, 7 EIiz. 2, c. 5, § 2 (1).
6 5Adoption Act, 1958, 7 Eliz. 2, c. 5. § 2 (2).
66 See, e.g., Vidal v. Commag&re, 13 La. Ann. 516 (1858); Fuselier v. Masse, 4 La. 640
(1832); Teal v. Sevier, 26 Tex. 516 (1863).
87 The eighteen-year age variation of the Roman law was carried into the Partidas.
LAS SETE PARTmAS 4.16.2 (Spain CCH 1931).
68 LA. CIV. CODE art. 35 (1808), as cited in Comp. ED. OF LA. CIv. CODES art. 214, at
125 (1940).




period by special legislative action. 70 In 1864 the state constitution
was amended to permit general adoption legislation,71 and in 1865
specific adoption provisions were enacted.72 The Civil Code of 1870
contained an article setting forth requirements for adoption and
the civil effects produced by it.73 Patterned to some degree after the
French Civil Code of 1803,74 the Louisiana codal provision required
that the adopter be at least forty years old and at least fifteen years
older than the adoptee. In 1872, however, the legislature eliminated
the required age difference in minor adoptions and provided that
the adopter merely need be over the age of twenty-one. 75
The early adoption statutes enacted by Texas after its statehood"
betray some civil law influence and were so interpreted by the
courts.77 There was, however, no minimum age nor age difference
requirement.
Although early courts in various other jurisdictions sometimes
suggested that Roman or Greek law was the source of adoption
statutes in this country,78 this appears to be accurate only to the
extent that we define adoption as an artificially created parent-child
relationship. Except in the early law of Louisiana and Texas, there
has been very little Roman law influence on adoption laws in the
70 See, e.g., La. Acts 1860, No. 181; La. Acts 1837, No. 65.
71 LA. CONsT. art. 117 (1864).
72 La. Acts, 1st Sess. 1865, No. 48.
73 LA. REv. Civ. CoDE art. 214 (1870).
7 CODE CIVIL art. 343 (Fr. 1803).
Ir La. Acts 1872, No. 31. The requirement of a fifteen-year age difference remained
in article 214 of the Civil Code until 1948, when it was eliminated by La. Acts 1948,
No. 454. The age difference requirement probably remained in effect for adult adop-
tions during this time. However, the history of adoption of adults in Louisiana is
extremely confused and there is some question whether it was even legally possible
between 1870 and 1924. See Succession of Pizzati, 141 La. 645, 75 So. 498 (1917). An
out-of-state adoption of an adult was attacked in Louisiana during this period on
the ground that it had not been shown that the adopter and adoptee were more than
fifteen years apart in age. The challenge was unsuccessful because of lack of evi-
dence in the record as to the ages of the parties, and thus a possible public policy
issue based on conflict of laws was avoided. Succession of Caldwell, 114 La. 195, 38
So. 140 (1905). See generally Wadlington, Adoption of Adults in Louisiana, 40 TeL. L.
REV. 1 (1965).
7 Texas enacted an adoption statute in 1850. DIG. LAWs OF TEx. 88 (Hartley
1850). Very simple in form, it specifically limited the inheritance rights of an adopted
child in the event that there were legitimate blood children born to the adopter before
or after the adoption. The act speaks almost wholly in terms of adoption as a "legal
heir."
7 See Eckford v. Knox, 67 Tex. 200, 204, 2 S.W. 372, 374 (1886).
78E.g., Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 262 (1880); Morrison v. Estate of Sessions,
70 Mich. 297, 306-07, 38 N.W. 249, 253 (1888); In the Matter of Livingston, 151 App.
Div. 1, 2, 135 N.Y. Supp. 328, 329 (1912).
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United States. Greater influence is seen in the laws of Puerto Rico,
however, where a sixteen-year age difference between adopter and
adoptee is required-unless the adopter has been married to the
adoptee's father or mother for at least five years at the date when
the adoption petition is filed.7 9
B. The Massachusetts Statute of 1851
Frequently referred to as the earliest of indigenous United States
adoption laws, 0 the Massachusetts statute of 185181 made no ref-
erence to a minimum age difference between adopter and adoptee.
This statute, which remained the nucleus of the Massachusetts adop-
tion law for over half a century, was used as a model for the drafting
of early adoption legislation in a number of other states.8 2
C. The Field Code
The 1865 Civil Code of New York, widely known as the Field
Code,83 exerted a profound influence on the private law of a num-
ber of western states, even though it was never adopted in New York
itself.8 4 Though not included in the earlier published draft,85
the 1865 code contained fairly comprehensive provisions on the law
of adoption, and required that "the person adopting a child must
be at least twenty years older than the person adopted . ,s"86 This
provision was incorporated, for example, into the California Civil
Code in 1871 with a reduction in the required age variation to fif-
teen years.87 In 1874 the age difference was reduced to ten years.88
70 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 531 (1955).8 0 The Texas statute mentioned in note 76 supra was enacted a year earlier. Missis.
sippi had a provision for making an heir of one who was a stranger to the family
as early as 1846. Miss. Laws 1846, ch. 60, also cited in MIss. CODE ch. 35, art. 2 (Hutchi-
son 1848). But neither of these statutes was nearly so detailed or complete as that of
Massachusetts, and it is even questionable that they should be considered as adoption
statutes at all, in the present sense of the word.
sI Mass. Gen. Laws 1836-1853, ch. 324, at 752 (1854).
82 For a judicial discussion of the influence of the Massachusetts statute on the laws
of Wisconsin and Illinois, see Keegan v. Geraghty, 101 Ill. 26, 33 (1881).
8 3 COMMIssIONERS OF THE CODE, CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1865).
David Dudley Field was among the Commissioners, who had been appointed pursuant
to the Act of April 6, 1857, 1 N.Y. Laws ch. 266 (1857). In theory the code represented
a civilian approach to codification, though the existing common law was said to form
its substantive base. COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, op. cit. supra at iii-iv.
8 New York did enact an adoption statute in 1873, but it contained no requirement
of an age difference between adopter and adoptee. N.Y. Laws ch. 830 (1873).
Sr COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, DRAFT OF A CIVIL CODE FOR THE STATE OF NEW
YORK (1862).
86 COMMIssIONERS OF THE CODE, CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YoRK § 108 (1865).
11 CAL. Civ. CODE § 222 (1871).
"Amendments to Codes of Cal. 1873-1874, § 48, at 813.
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This ten-year age difference in the California statute apparently
formed the original model for similar provisions in other western
territories and states, including Arizona,89 Montana,90 Nevada,9 1
New Mexico,92 North Dakota,9 3 and Utah.94 Idaho adopted the
original California requirement of an age difference of fifteen years.95
D. The Uniform Adoption Act
Though formally adopted to date in only two states, Montana9 6
and Oklahoma, 7 the Uniform Adoption Act9" has clearly exerted
strong influence in a number of others.99 It specifies no minimum
age difference for minor adoptions. Consensus of the Commissioners
against including such a requirement has been explained on the
basis that "years alone do not qualify one for parenthood."'100 How-
ever, the Uniform Act does list an optional age difference require-
ment in the case of adult adoptions. 10
Ironically, the two states which have adopted the Uniform Act
both had minimum age difference requirements which were elim-
inated on passage of the Uniform Act.102
E. Other Influences
In addition to the four influential approaches mentioned above,
some states developed varying adoption statutes independent of
these factors, often at a very early date. The Uniform Adoption
Act has not been the only legislative guide. The Children's Bureau
of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, for ex-
0 Aiuz. REv. STAT. § 2037 (1901).0 MONT. CoMP. STAT. div. 5, ch. 1, § 2, at 587 (Supp. ed. 1888).
91 Nev. Stats. 1885, ch. 24, § 1. This section did provide, however, that if a husband
and wife were adopting a child, only one of them need be ten years older.
02 N.M. CoMP. LAWs § 1497 (1897).
93 N.D. REv. CODES § 2798 (1895).
' UTAH REV. STAT. tit. 1, § 2 (1898).
05 IDAHO REV. CODES § 2546 (1887).
00 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 61-201 to -218 (1962), as amended, MONT. RaV. CODFS
ANN. §§ 61-211 to -212 (Supp. 1965).
07 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 60.1-.23 (Supp. 1964).
98 The Uniform Act was promulgated in 1953 by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws.
00 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2587.1 to .18 (Supp. 1965); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§
1-707.1 to -711.2 (Supp. 1965).
20 Merrill & Merrill, Toward Uniformity in Adoption Law, 40 IOWA L. REv. 299,
303 (1955).
101 UNIFORm ADOPTION Acr § 18. The bracketed, optional age difference is ten years.
1 0 The superseded provisions are cited in MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 61-128 (1947),
and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 42 (1941).
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ample, has published suggested legislative language for "An Act
for the Adoption of Children,"'10 3 which contains no requirement of
an age difference between adopter and adoptee. However, the four
influences mentioned above appear to have been the most important
with regard to the inclusion or omission of a required minimum age
difference.
IV
THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Adoption is a matter for individual state regulation in this
country, and despite various attempts to encourage uniformity, the
approaches vary greatly from state to state. This is especially true
with regard to requiring a minimum age variation between adopter
and adoptee. Some states have no requirement of a specific age dif-
ference, but do require that the adopter must be "older" than the
adopted person,104 or that the adopter must be a major in order to
adopt a minor.10 5 Twelve states now require a specific age differ-
ence. °06 Within this group there are variations in the specific dif-
ference in ages; in whether the requirement applies only to adop-
tion of minors, or to adoption of adults, or to both; and in excep-
tions allowed in specific situations, such as when the adopter is
married to the blood parent.
Of these twelve states which require a specific difference in age,
ten apply the requirement to adoption of minors. 07 Eight specify
an age difference of ten years and two specify fifteen years. 08 Only
six of these twelve states apply any specific age difference provision
203 See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, LEGIS-
LATIVE Gum-s FOR THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RFSPONSBILITIES AND THE
ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 49-61 (1961).
10 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-67 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 1 (1955).
10r E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 72.11 (1964).
106 By use of the term "specified age difference" or words of similar import, it is
meant to include only statutes which require a minimum of some fixed number of
years in age separation. This does not include statutes which require that the adopter
need merely be "older" than the adoptee, or that the adopter must be a major and
the adoptee a minor. The states with specified age difference requirements applicable to
some or all of their adoption provisions are Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and
West Virginia. The provisions of the individual statutes within each of these states are
discussed in greater detail in the Appendix infra.
107 These are Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia. See the Appendix infra.
108 Except for Idaho and West Virginia, which require an age difference of fifteen




to adoptions of adults.109 Three require a ten year difference, 110
two require a fifteen year difference, 1 and one requires a difference
of twenty years." 2
Although the fact that fewer states have age differential require-
ments for adoption of adults than for adoption of minors can be
explained in part by the fact that not all states permit adoption of
adults, this is by no means the only reason for such a substantial
variation in the figures. Several jurisdictions which permit adoption
of both minors and adults have age variation requirements which
apply only to one or the other category of adoption.1 3 Four states,
however, have required variations for adoption of both majors and
minors."14 Yet even one of these states provides a different age varia-
tion for adult adoptions than for minor adoptions."15
Where a minor is being adopted, at least one other factor be-
comes material. This is the almost universal provision for exercise
of discretion by the trial judge in determining whether an adoption
will be in the best interests of the adoptee. Even in states which
require no specific age differential, a judge may nevertheless be
empowered to grant or deny an adoption on the basis of the fairly
vague test of the child's best interest; that age may be a factor for
his consideration is at least suggested by the statutory requirement
in many states that the petition for adoption must include both the
age of the party to be adopted and the age of each prospective
adopter."16 But since the party to be adopted has frequently lived
in the home of the adopter for some time, the judge, in weigh-
ing how best to exercise his discretion, might in the child's
best interest overlook the closeness of age in order to avoid
201 Florida, Idaho, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Utah (which has
only a limited provision for adoption of adults). Nevada and California, which have
required age differences for adoption of minors, require that in adoption of adults
the adopter must be "older" than the adoptee.
110 Florida, North Dakota, and Utah.
121 New Jersey, which only requires a ten year age difference in adoption of minors,
increases the required age spread to fifteen years in adoption of adults. Idaho's fifteen
year difference seems to apply to adoption of adults as well as adoption of minors.
112 New Mexico, which now has no requirement of a specific age difference in adop-
tion of minors, requires a twenty-year age difference in adoption of adults.
:23 These include California, Nevada, and West Virginia (and probably Georgia),
with fixed age difference statutes applicable only to adoption of minors, plus Florida
and New Mexico, which have such provisions applicable only in adoption of adults.
""' Idaho, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Utah.
"'r New Jersey requires a ten-year age difference for minor adoptions and a fifteen-
year age difference for adult adoptions.
116 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 72.12 (1964); LA. REv. STAT. tit. 9, § 424 (1965).
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returning the child for a second placement, even though he would
have frowned on permitting such a placement initially. This, of
course, places the problem squarely in the lap of the placing indi-
vidual or agency. And although many agencies may make it a
practice to require a minimum age spread, there may be no legal
requirement that they do S0 .117 Further, in the case of the private
placement, there are all too often no restraints or even guidelines for
gauging the likelihood of effective placement.
In summary, it would seem that there are at least some restraints
in most states on the too-close-together-in-age adoption. In the case
of adult adoptions, the restraint can be found only in the form of
specific statutes. In the case of minor adoptions, the restraint may
be a specific statutory one or, more frequently, a discretionary pro-
vision. However, very few cases have actually been litigated in ap-
pellate courts over this issue 118 and the recent statutory trend, if
there is one, is toward elimination of mandatory age difference for
adoption in this country. 19
V
SOME LESSONS FROM COMPARISON: SHouLD AN AGE
DIFFERENCE BE REQUIRED?
It is difficult to explain the dichotomy between civil law juris-
dictions and our own states regarding the requirement of a minimum
age variation between adopter and adoptee. In the civil law juris-
dictions, the emphasis of adoption law traditionally has revolved
around providing an heir for the adopter, or gratifying the personal
desires of childless parents in their declining years-in other
words, adoption has focused on the interests of the adopter, rather
""The administrative regulations for the licensing of placement agencies some-
times include such provisions. For example, in Louisiana these regulations require
each agency to make a study of the adoptive home. The written record of the study
must show that "the adoptive parents are of an age that they could be the child's
natural parents." LA. DEP'T. OF PuBuc WELFARE, MINImuI REQUIREMENTS FOR LICENSE
oF CmL PLACING AGENCIES 23-24 (1959).
228 Generally, the cases that do take up the issue indicate that the courts will con-
strue the provisions strictly. E.g., Hendy v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 115 Mont. 516, 519, 146
P.2d 324, 325 (1944). In some the requirement is described as jurisdictional. In
the Matter of Estate of Sharon, 179 Cal. 447, 454, 177 Pac. 283, 286 (1918); Estate of
Summers, 51 Cal. App. 2d 89, 44-45, 124 P.2d 94, 97 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942). But cf.
Gravelin v. Porier, 77 Mont. 260, 279, 250 Pac. 823, 828 (1926).
"19 There probably has not been enough legislative activity recently to establish
any real trend. But the promulgation of the Uniform Adoption Act without a required
age difference and its acceptance in two states which formerly had required age varia-
tions has thinned the ranks somewhat. See notes 96-99 supra and accompanying text.
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than on the interests of the adoptee.120 This emphasis is due to the
influence of Roman adoption concepts on civil law. Additionally,
the basic Roman principle of adoptio naturam imitatur has carried
through to modem civil law, and this explains the minimum age
provisions in most civil law statutes. Importantly, these provisions
are generally applicable without regard to the age of the adoptee
or the motives which led to adoption. Adult adoptions were not
uncommon in Roman times, and in the original French code there
was no provision for adoption of a person before he had attained
majority. 12 1
A. Adoption of Minors
When the emphasis is shifted to the needs of the adoptee, the
wisdom of the "adoption imitates nature" principle seems to be
even clearer. With respect to adoptions of minors in this country,
courts and legislatures have repeatedly proclaimed that the insti-
tution is designed chiefly to serve and protect the interests and wel-
fare of the person adopted.122 In fact, courts in this country may
refuse to recognize adoptions from countries where the institution
is not so oriented.123  Given our ostensible desire to make the
adopted child as much a member of the adopting family as pos-
sible-to duplicate closely the natural parent-child relationship
through this artificial, legal process-it would seem that our adoption
laws would be most concerned with placing a child only in a
biologically-possible age relationship, rather than in one where it
is obvious that he could not be the natural child of the adopter.
Of course, the possibility of extremely close age difference be-
tween the adopter and a minor adoptee is minimized in most cases
120 For a look at the various ends which adoption has served in history, see Hamilton-
Grierson, An Example of Legal Make-Believe, 21 JuRm. REv. 17 (1909); Huard, The
Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743 (1956).
121 See CODE CIVIL art. 346 (Fr. 1803).
12 2 Cases which have so stated include Adoption of Thevenin, 189 Cal. App. 2d
245, 252, 11 Cal. Rptr. 219, 224 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); In the Matter of Brock, 157 Fla.
291, 294, 25 So. 2d 659, 661 (1946); Fowler v. Sutton, 222 Miss. 74, 76, 75 So. 2d 438,
439 (1954); In re Adoption of Blachinsky, 127 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (Surr. Ct. 1953);
In re Adoption of List, 418 Pa. 503, 515, 211 A.2d 870, 877 (1965).
Statutes which so provide include CAL. Crv. CODE § 227 (Supp. 1965); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-218 (b) (3) (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 72.20 (1964); N.Y. Dom. RE. LAW §§ 114,
116(4); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 4 (1963).
123 See, e.g., In the Matter of Estate of Gillies, 8 N.J. 88, 83 A.2d 889 (1951);
Doulgeris v. Bambacus, 203 Va. 670, 127 S.E.2d 145 (1962), 49 VA. L. REv. 1424 (1963).
Non-recognition of adoptions because of dissimilarity in approaches is criticized strongly
in Taintor, Adoption in the Conflict of Laws, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 222 (1954).
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by the discretionary function of the judge and by the administrative
regulations and procedures of various placement agencies. 124 There
are still a substantial number of instances, however, where this will
not be true. If a minimum age difference is in fact desirable, what
objection is there to legislation which would assure that such a
difference will be maintained in all cases? This not only would
be in keeping with the ostensible purpose of our adoption laws, but
also would constitute express approval of this purpose.
B. Adoption of Adults
Is it necessary to provide a minimum age difference for adult
adoptions? There is little authority available to answer this ques-
tion because interest and practice in this country have centered
on adoption of minors. Thus, appellate decisions concerning adop-
tion of adults are lacking, 25 the legal literature on the subject is
sparse, and a number of states still permit only minors to be
adopted.1 26 On the basis of the usual procedural differences be-
tween adoptions of adults and minors, along with the greater em-
phasis on benefits to the adoptee which is found in minor adoptions,
it could be argued that adult adoptions should be regarded as sui
generis in our law, and that requirements for a minimum age dif-
ference, even though properly applicable to adoptions of minors,
should not be imposed when an adult is being adopted. The argu-
ments on both sides of this proposition must be carefully considered.
First, not all of the factors which seemingly dictate a need for a
minimum age difference in the case of adoptions of minors would be
applicable to adoptions of adults. For example, in the latter in-
stance there is little chance of any deep psychic scarring of the
adoptee when he is obviously aware that the general public will
know that he could not be the adopter's blood child but he has
nevertheless consented to the adoption. The situation is much dif-
ferent in the case of the infant who is placed in an adoptive home
through a judicial proceeding in which the records of trial are ac-
124 See notes 116-17 supra and accompanying paragraph.
125 The small number of appellate cases on adoption of adults have often questioned
the public policy of permitting adoption when the parties occupy certain personal
relationships, or have attacked the competency or free consent of the adopter. See, e.g.,
Greene v. Fitzpatrick, 220 Ky. 590, 295 S.W. 896 (1927); Collamore v. Learned, 171
Mass. 99, 50 N.E. 518 (1898); Russell Adoption Case, 166 Pa. Super. 590, 73 A.2d 794
(1950); Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 823, 824-27 n.9 (1957).




corded great confidentiality2 7 and after which a substitute birth
certificate may be issued to indicate that the adopters are in fact
the blood parents of the adopted child. 128
A second consideration rendered unimportant in adult adoptions
is the need for determining the desirability of the adoptive home
as a place for the cultural, intellectual, and physical growth of the
adoptee. Factors ranging from the educational background of the
parents to their ability to provide financially for the child are
clearly relevant in minor adoptions; it is in order to consider such
factors that judicial supervision is almost universally required.
These factors generally need not be taken into consideration in adult
adoptions. Unless the adoptee is under a disability, there probably
will be no legal duty for the adopter to provide financial assistance
except in cases in which an adoptee becomes destitute. The adoptee
may not even live with the adopter after the adoption. Aside from
love and affection or possible financial gain to either adopter or
adoptee, the motives for adoption of an adult may range from
spite to ego massage; 129 whether the adoption would be in the
adoptee's best interests is (as generally required for adoption of a
minor) irrelevant when only the consent of adopter and adoptee is
necessary to effectuate the adoption.
The prime reason for deciding that none of these arguments
should prevail is rooted in the definition of adoption as the insti-
tution is known to us. In our present system adoption is designed
to create through artificial means something resembling as closely
as possible a normal parent-child relationship and not a freak or
totally new form of relation. If in fact adoption of adults is de-
signed to accomplish something different, then such a purpose should
be expressed clearly in the enabling statutes. But this is not the
case at present. Despite the variations in procedure between adult
and minor adoptions, adoption of an adult generally will accomplish
most or all of the civil effects that will be achieved through adoption
of a minor. The desirability of this has been questioned judicially, 30
.but as yet there seems to be no major legislative movement to ex-
127 Some statutes specifically require confidentiality in adoption proceedings. E.g.,
UNIFORMi ADOPTION AcT § 13; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25 (Supp. 1963).
128 Substitute birth. certificate requirements are found, for example, in UNIFORM
ADOPTION ACr optional § 14, and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-29 (Supp. 1965).
121 See note 6 supra.
120 See, e.g., Wilson v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Ky. 1965).
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pand or change the institution of adoption of adults; if anything,
it is still being ignored.
Without a normal age gap between adopter and adoptee, the
result of assimilation closely to the normal parent-child relationship
will not be accomplished. It was on this theory that the Romans
(who also permitted adoption in relationships other than parent-
child, such as grandparent-grandchild1 31 ) applied the adoptio naturam
imitatur concept without regard to the age of the adoptee. The
reasoning is equally applicable today. The importance of statutory
regulation in this regard for adult adoptions is particularly great
because of the simplicity of most state adult adoption procedures. 182
VI
WHAT LEGISLATION Is REQUIRED?
In reviewing the various statutes both here and abroad, two ap-
proaches emerge which would be legally feasible, with some varia-
tions or exceptions possible within the framework of each. The
first approach would be to require a specified age difference be-
tween adopter and adoptee, perhaps combined with elimination or
relaxation of the restriction when the person to be adopted is the
blood child of the prospective adopter or his spouse. The second
approach would be to set a high minimum age requirement for the
adopting party and permit only adoption of minors. If the minimum
age were set at thirty, for example, at least a ten-year age difference
would be assured. A variation on this approach would be to allow
adoption of minors only up to a certain age-say fifteen years-and
only by persons over twenty-five years of age.
The second approach would restrict the available pool of adopters
considerably. Such an approach seems even more objectionable be-
cause placements are frequently made when the adoptee is extremely
young-particularly where an adoption agency is involved-and
thus the age difference between parent and child might be un-
desirably great. 33 The alternative of lowering the maximum age
13'See BUCKLAND, A TExTBooK OF ROMAN LAW 123 (3d rev. ed. 1963).
132 Of course, more rigorous control of adult adoptions or complete abolition of the
institution are additional possibilities. See notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, a required age difference would partially alleviate the problems of
abortive adult adoptions.
"I' For expert opinions that great disparity in age between adopters and adoptee
is inimical to the child's best interests, see Brunt v. Watkins, 233 Miss. 307, 101 So. 2d




for adoption to fifteen would obviate that problem but would never-
theless eliminate the adoption of children over fifteen-a result
contrary to the recent judicial awakening to the need for parental
aid and assistance for children even beyond their majority'34
and the legislative trend to relax the requirement of parental
consent 35 which has often thwarted adoption of the older neg-
lected child. Some form of the first approach, which, incidentally,
is the type of approach taken by the civil law, thus seems to be
preferable because none of these objections is applicable.
A. What Should Be the Required Age Difference?
The Roman law requirement of an eighteen-year age difference
between adopter and adoptee was based on the latest time at which
the male could be considered to have reached puberty.13 6 Eighteen
years is greater than the generally accepted age of puberty for males
today; 37 and if puberty is to be a factor, females must also be con-
sidered since today they legally may adopt in most, if not all, states.
If the age difference now were to be based solely on the reaching
of puberty, further questions would be raised. Should the minimum,
average, or latest age for reaching puberty be used? Should there
be a different age variation requirement for male and female adop-
ters? In view of these problems and other possible variables, rang-
ing from geography to difference in ethnic groups, a strict puberty
test would seem impractical today.
One possible alternative would be to use the minimum age for
marriage in computing the required age variation for adoption. 38
2'A growing trend toward requiring contribution toward college expenses-even
though the child may be past majority-is one illustration of this phenomenon. See
Crane v. Crane, 45 Ill. App. 2d 316, 322-27, 196 N.E.2d 27, 30-33 (1964) (dissenting
opinion), and authorities cited therein.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 63-351 (4) (Supp. 1964).
'" See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
37 Puberty is defined from a medical standpoint today as "the age of a person
during which the sex and reproductive organs begin to function and become effective,
and the secondary sex characteristics develop." SCHrIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE 656 (1965). Though most medical texts do not speak in terms of exact age,
it is probably agreed that the average age of puberty, which falls in the middle of
adolescence, is between twelve and fourteen for females and fourteen and sixteen for
males. See STUART & PRUGH, THE HEALTHY CHILD 4, 6-7 (1960).
138 The very existence of such minimum age statutes is strong argument in favor
of a minimum age difference between adopter and adoptee, in order that the latter
will not appear to have been born at a time when the adopting parents legally could
not have been married. This must be tempered somewhat, however, by the fact that




Again, the variations within most states between the provisions
for men and women on marriageable age must be considered.13 9
Additionally, age for marriage is by no means based simply on de-
velopment of the reproductive capacity of the parties; there are a
considerable number of age variations between states;140 and there
is judicial confusion as to the minimum age at which a marriage will
be considered voidable or void. 41
Probably the best answer is a compromise: a mandatory age varia-
tion within the realm of biological probability and within or near
legal possibility as well, at least to the extent of a voidable rather
than a void marriage. It is submitted that the most acceptable com-
promise, applying these standards, would call for a fifteen-year age
variation.
B. What Exceptions Should Be Permitted?
In an institution which is clearly artificial to begin with, there
is always the possibility of creating exceptions, if the purpose for
such exceptions is socially desirable. Probably the two excep-
tions which would be most universally accepted would involve
(1) the remarriage of a natural parent and the desire of the new
spouse to adopt his spouse's child,14 and (2) the desire of a
natural parent to adopt his own illegitimate child. 43 In such cases
there is a clear, biological separation between the adoptee and at
least one parent in all cases. However, it is submitted that there is
still no good reason to eliminate entirely the age separation require-
ment except in situation (2). Otherwise we could easily envision
the bizarre-though not unusual-case of a seventy-year-old man with
a forty-year-old daughter marrying his thirty-year-old secretary who
then desired to adopt her husband's child-a child ten years her
13'The following statutes, for example, provide minimum ages of twenty-one
and eighteen for males and females to be married without parental consent: ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 89, § 3. (1965); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. cl'. 207, § 7 (1955); N.Y. Do, .
RFtL. LAW § 15.
140 For example, Georgia provides minimum ages of eighteen and sixteen for mar-
riage by males and females with parental consent (GA. CODE ANN. § 53-102 (Supp. 1965)),
while thd corresponding ages in New York are sixteen and fourteen (N.Y. DoM. REL.
LAW § 15). Without parental consent, the minimum age for both males and females
is twenty-one in Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-5 (1958), and only nineteen
in Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 53-204 (Supp. 1965)).
1"4See 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 11 (1948).
142 Such an exception is already made in the statutes of Idaho and West Virginia.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-501 (Supp. 1965); W. VA. CODE § 4756 (1961).
13 This would only be necessary, however, for cases in which there is no pro.
vision for legitimation, or where such provisions are extremely limited in scope.
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senior. If we are to continue our basic approach of trying to as-
similate the institution of adoption as closely as we can to the
natural parent-child relationship, we may lower the age difference
to no less than ten years. Even if we wish to eliminate the puberty
consideration entirely for policy reasons, it still seems that an age
difference of ten years would be in order.144 Perhaps the best way
to handle situation (1) would be to adopt the approach to the original
English statute, which merely gave the judge discretion to lower
the age variation requirement if circumstances warranted it.145
VII
Is THERE A REAL NEED FOR LEGISLATION?
Adoption is a relatively narrow institution; to permit its ex-
pansion beyond the narrow bounds for which it was accepted into
our law is to weaken it. When it becomes obvious that adoption
purely for tax advantage or inheritance purposes is available, the
entire institution can be damaged.1 4 If we want adoption to con-
tinue as a socially useful institution, we should not tolerate abortive
uses to be made of it. Legislation seems to be the logical preventive
against such uses; and immediate legislation, before these unsavory
practices become widespread, would seem to be a wise course.
14, Of course, one justification for a ten-year separation would be the fact that this
is presently the most popular age variation found among states which have any required
age difference other than simply "older." See the Appendix infra.
'" See pt. II of this article supra. It is not suggested that the originally unclear
drafting of the English statute be followed.
"'As one judge has put it: "The increased frequency with which these cases are
arising raises the question of whether, as the word gets around, there will be more
adoption or treasure hunts as they may be called which take advantage of the pro-
vision in a will wherein an estate is left for life with remainder to children, heirs,
etc. In every such instance where there are no children or heirs, the way has been
opened by use of adoption to take advantage of the testator and his estate." Wilson







Cal.2  103 older 4
Fla. none5  100
Ga. 107  unclear 8




N.M. none 6  2017
N. D. 1018 1019
S. D. 1020 *
Utah 1021 1022
W. Va. 1523 none
24
* No statutory provision for adult adoptions.1 AIuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-101 (1956).
2An illegitimate child can be "adopted" (actually legitimated) by acknowledgment
and conduct of natural parent, with no required age difference. CAL. CIV. CODE § 230.
3 CAL. CIv. CODE § 222.
CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 221, 227p.
5 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 72.11 (1964).
FrA. STAT. ANN. § 72.34 (1964).
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-402 (Supp. 1962).
No specific age difference is required by the adult adoption provision. GA. CODE
ANN. § 74-420 (Supp. 1962). Yet the age difference requirement for minors, while
located within the general provisions for minor adoptions, uses the term "child"
rather than "minor child," which could be interpreted to mean that it applies to adults
as well. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-402 (Supp. 1962).
9An "adoption" (legitimation) provision similar to California's (note 2 supra)
is found in IDAHO CODE ANN. § 161510 (Supp. 1965).
1 oIDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1502 (Supp. 1965). The requirement is waived where the
adopter's spouse is the natural parent. Ibid.
"'Adoption of adults is narrowly limited, and it is unclear whether the fifteen-year
age requirement is applicable. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1501 (Supp. 1965).
12 NEv. REv. STAT. § 127.020 (1963).
13 NEv. REv. STAT. § 127.190 (1963). Adoption of spouses is forbidden. Ibid.
:1 N.J. REv. STAT. § 9:3-22 (1937).
5 N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:22-2 (1937).
18 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-1 (1953).
17 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-13 (1953).
18 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-11-02 (1960).
19 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-11-08 (1960).
20 S.D. CODE § 14-0401 (1939).
21 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-2 (1953).
22 Ibid. Both natural parents of adults must be deceased before he can be adopted.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1 (1953).
23 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4756 (1961). The requirement is waived where the adopter's
spouse is the natural parent. Ibid.
2See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4760 (1) (1961).
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